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DIGNITY AND ITS VIOLATION EXAMINED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF 
ANIMAL ETHICS 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper I aim to analyse the concept of ‘dignity’ in relation to other than human 
animals and to examine how this concept might be of use in informing us of actions that 
may harm such animals. In doing so, I will firstly outline some of the characteristic 
features of actions that may be said to violate dignity before proceeding to analyse the 
idea that one can degrade a being by treating it in a way that is excessively instrumental 
and further to examine an ontological explanation for why some actions that harm 
nonhuman animals can be thought of as a violation of dignity. Some of the relevant issues 
arising from an examination of dignity and its violation involve reflection on notions 
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such flourishing, consent and autonomy. Such linking issues will be considered in 
relation to the application of the concept of dignity to nonhuman beings.   
 
HUMAN DIGNITY AND ANIMALS 
The word ‘dignity’ may be used in a presentational sense (Meyer 1989, 522), for 
example, one might say “she  presents herself with dignity”, or in a social sense 
(Szawarski 1986, 193), for example, one might say “she fulfilled her duty with dignity, or 
honour”. However, in this paper I will not be using ‘dignity’ in either of these senses. 
Rather, the sense of dignity I will be concerned with is one that is related to ideas about 
the value or worth of a being. This latter sense of dignity has a long history, and tends to 
be a concept that is thought to be applicable to human animals only, and more 
specifically to human persons—moral agents, capable of rationality, of directing their 
own lives, and of formulating their own goals and plans for the future. Most notably, the 
Kantian principle regarding respect for the dignity of persons is based on considerations 
of the value of humanity ‘insofar as it is capable of morality’:  
[T]hat which constitutes the condition under which alone something can 
be an end in itself has not merely a relative value, that is, a price, but an 
inner value, that is, dignity… Morality, and humanity insofar as it is 
capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity… [T]he lawgiver 
itself, which determines all worth, must for that very reason have a 
dignity, that is, an unconditional… worth; and the word respect alone 
provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it that a rational 
being must give. Autonomy is… the ground of the dignity of human 
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nature and of every rational nature’ (Kant 1996 [1785], 4:435-436, 
pp.84-85). 
Human persons, being endowed with reasoning capabilities which enable them to 
exercise their autonomy and to be guided by moral imperatives, are to be treated as ends 
in themselves, never merely as a means to ends: 
I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as 
an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at 
its discretion; instead he must in all his actions… always be regarded at 
the same time as an end (ibid, 4: 428, p.79).  
Immanuel Kant’s principle of the respect for the dignity of persons applies to rational, 
moral agents only. Accordingly, humans alone have the qualities or characteristics which 
make them worthy of direct moral respect.  
In spite of sceptical arguments regarding the usefulness of dignity as a concept 
(see Macklin 2003, 1419-1420), as well as concerns related to the vagueness of the 
concept (see Caulfield and Chapman 2005, 736-738), and difficulties arising from 
consideration of its content (see Birnbacher 1996, 107-121; and Cochrane 2010, 234-
241), the Kantian understanding of dignity has left a lasting legacy and has a firm 
foothold in ethics and law today (see Hailer and Ritschl 1996, 98-102); aspects of it can 
being found in, for example, the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
according to which ‘All human beings are born free, equal in dignity and human rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in the 
spirit of brotherhood’ (United Nations General Assembly 1948, Article 1). 
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Moreover, the claim that dignity as a concept is applicable to humans only (see; 
Rolston 2008, 129-153; Lee and George 2008, 409-433; and Gaylin 1984, 18-22) re-
affirms the perceived and overestimated gulf between humans (who tend to be considered 
as ‘special ‘in the light of what are thought to be their distinctive rational capacities) and 
other animals (who are viewed and often treated as if they have lesser mental powers in 
comparison to humans), as if maintaining such a gulf provides us with a reason to accord 
humans a higher moral status than animals. I say ‘as if’ for even if we assumed for 
argument’s sake that there is indeed such a gulf, and that humans are different in kind 
from other animals, this in and of itself does not make it permissible to treat animals as 
we please or to use them as a means to an end only, or even to accord them a lower status 
than humans. 
In spite of this, animals’ supposed lack of reason is often appealed to as an 
attempted justification for our exploitation and objectification of animals in modern-day 
practices (particularly factory farming and animal experimentation). But it would be 
worth remembering that just as appeals to a lack of reason and moral agency have been 
used as an attempted justification for our use of animals in often painful and lethal 
experiments, so too have such appeals been used in the past as attempted justifications for 
experimenting on those humans who lacked such characteristics.  Such humans included 
the insane, prisoners, and children. Experimenting on such people was not always seen as 
a moral problem.1  
Moreover, it should be said here that there are, of course, many human beings 
who lack certain mental capacities, and yet if the concept of dignity is applicable only to 
beings that possess certain rational powers which accord them with a special status then it 
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would appear that many humans would be excluded from having such a status. However, 
for those who have a human-centred conception of dignity, the concept is often 
explicated as related to humans as members of the species Homo sapiens; it is claimed, 
for example, that it is being a member of this species and this species alone that makes 
humans ‘special’ (Gaylin 1984, 18-22) and unique (Rolston 2008, 129-153). On such a 
view, the concept of dignity is a concept which in some sense reflects the ‘specialness’ of 
human beings and the differences between humans and other animals.   
But as Lisa Bortolotti and John Harris plausibly argue, the claim that all and only 
humans have dignity purely on the basis of their species membership is a form of 
discrimination (specifically, speciesism) comparable to that of sexism and racism. In 
relation to stem cell research and to a discussion of specific Kantian and utilitarian 
interpretations of the principle of human dignity they claim the following: 
Notice that… the objection [against stem cell research] relies on dignity 
being an attribute of human life as such. But there is nothing intrinsically 
valuable about belonging to the species Homo sapiens. Granting rights 
and interests on the basis of species membership alone seems totally 
arbitrary and it is comparable, as a practice, to granting rights and 
interests on the basis of race or sex (2005, 74).  
Indeed, what is intrinsically valuable about human beings is not their species membership 
per se, but rather the flourishing or development of their essential capacities in a way that 
furthers their own good where, as Robin Attfield, claims ‘[c]apacities may be defined as 
essential capacities of a species, if and only if a species would forego its current identity 
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in the absence of any of these capacities from most of its members’ (1995, 48). 
The same applies to animals; that is, what is intrinsically valuable about animals is the 
flourishing of their capacities in a way that furthers their own good.   
To summarise two issues arising from the aforementioned conceptions of dignity, 
if the concept of dignity is grounded in specific mental faculties of human beings (such as 
their rational powers) then, in order to be consistent, it would seem that animals that 
possess such mental abilities would qualify as beings to which the concept is applicable, 
while humans that lack such abilities would not qualify. But if the concept is applied to 
humans purely on the basis of species membership, then such an understanding runs the 
risk of being speciesist, based as it is on an arbitrary favouring of human beings as over 
and above all other species.  
 
DIGNITY AND ITS VIOLATION 
Despite criticism regarding the nature of the concept of dignity (see Macklin 2003, 1419-
1420; Caulfield and Chapman 2005, 736-738; Birnbacher 1996, 107-121; and Cochrane 
2010, 234-241), we frequently talk of dignity in relation to humans, and such talk appears 
to be a mainstay in discourses on ethics. This is not altogether surprising for, granting 
that the concept is difficult to explain, the word ‘dignity’ and phrases referring to its loss 
often seem to capture what we want to express in certain discussions in ethics; most 
notably in discussions relating to dying, a human’s loss of particular capacities, and to 
issues regarding bodily and mental health. Perhaps, as Philip Johnson notes, ‘The use of 
dignity seems to be a sort of uncertain attempt to find the right word or concept’ (1998, 
342). Johnson’s analysis of ‘dignity’ is one which focuses on ‘the factor of humanness’ 
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(ibid, 324) as an essential element of what dignity means. But if dignity does have a use, 
as many people (laypersons and professional ethicists included) seem to think it does, 
then in order to avoid charges of speciesism and inconsistency it is worth examining 
whether it can be applied to animals and in doing so evaluate some further reasons why 
animals are not usually considered to be beings to which the concept can be applied, for 
while the word ‘dignity’ is not one that is readily used in relation to animals, it seems that 
use of the term ‘dignity’ could well be appropriately used in a range of circumstances in 
which we find animals and for which we seek ‘to find the right word or concept’.  
One further possible reason why we do not usually apply such a concept to 
animals and their lives is because we are tempted to assume that whomever we attach the 
concept to must understand the concept, and recognise how their dignity can be infringed 
or violated. However, we do use the concept of dignity to refer to the degradation of 
human subjects who do not necessarily understand the concept or know what constitutes 
degradation. So it is not obvious that it cannot be applied to animals.   
Our understanding of the concept seems to depends upon an understanding of its 
opposite; an understanding of how a being can be degraded. When we say that someone’s 
dignity has been infringed we usually mean that that person has been degraded or 
humiliated in some way or another. As such, reflection on the characteristic features of 
actions that could possibly violate dignity may shed light on whether the concept of 
dignity can be appropriately applied to animals.  
We sometimes speak of “dignity remaining intact”, “a violation of dignity”, or we 
say, “She has had her dignity taken away from her”. Thus the concept of dignity is 
connected to, among other things (which will discussed below), ideas about the 
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wholeness of a being, and to a being remaining intact, physically and mentally. When we 
speak of a violation of dignity we are speaking of an act, actions or circumstances that 
infringe the wholeness of a being without that being’s consent. That wholeness may be 
violated through, for example, injury, confinement, disease or illness. However, talking 
of only the wholeness of a being with reference to consent is, admittedly, too general to 
explain the concept of dignity, since the ‘wholeness’ of one’s body may be purposely 
infringed upon, without consent, but without that infringement constituting a violation of 
dignity. For example, performing an operation on an infant to remove an infectious or 
diseased part of the body (and part of the body that has the potential to further severely 
harm or kill that infant) would (usually) not be seen as a violation of dignity. So it does 
seem that dignity is not just connected to ideas concerning the wholeness of a being and a 
lack of consent. Indeed, when we speak of a violation of dignity we are usually saying 
that a being’s consciousness, feelings or capacities are being undermined in a way that 
we consider to be morally unacceptable. So here the concept of dignity needs further 
explanation.  
Some characteristic features of actions that violate a subject’s dignity seem to be 
that such actions are carried out without the subject’s consent, the subject’s mental and / 
or physical being is manipulated or disrupted in some way or another, the intervention is 
unwanted, and the actions do not purposefully aim to benefit the subject.2 It does seem 
that actions that violate dignity not only cause harm and are done without consent, but 
also show a lack of consideration for a being’s interests. (There may, however, be 
exceptional cases where actions may violate a being’s dignity, yet may be done with that 
being’s consent. An example of such a case may be of a disabled human persuaded to 
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take part in a freak show, but one should bear in mind that in a case such as this 
autonomy may well be compromised and, as such, it may not be entirely correct to say 
that the relevant person is a fully consenting one.) Indeed, some actions may injure or 
disable a being in some way or another without that being’s consent, but cannot be said to 
violate a being since they are done to directly benefit the creature being harmed and to 
prevent further harm or to increase quality of life. In such circumstances such actions do 
not violate dignity since they show consideration for the interests of the creature 
concerned. An action may constitute a violation of dignity if it is an action that not only 
harms a being, but is done without consent and is not carried out in order to directly 
benefit the being that is harmed.  
There is then a difference between those actions that harm a being, without 
consent, yet take into account relevant interests and are carried out to directly benefit that 
being (actions of this sort cannot be said to be a violation of dignity), and those that, 
likewise, harm a being without consent, but are significantly different in that they do not 
take into account relevant interests and are not carried out to directly benefit that being 
(actions of this sort may violate dignity). Not all actions then that are not consented to 
and cause harm can be said to constitute a violation of dignity. (There may be other cases 
in which actions that cause harm to a being (by disabling or injuring that being in some 
way or another) do not constitute a violation of dignity, since it may be that the actions 
are done to a being with that being’s consent.  Such actions include, for example, giving 
freely chosen inoculations and tattoos. A person may choose to be harmed for some 
reason or other. She may choose to harm herself or may consent to someone else harming 
her. Such actions, since consented to, may possibly not be said to constitute a violation of 
 10
dignity.) 
If the features of actions that violate dignity are thought of in the way that has 
been outlined above then it is far from clear that there are no instances in which we can 
appropriately apply the concept of dignity to animals. In many practices, animals are 
treated in ways that do not benefit them, yet cause them substantial mental and / or 
physical suffering. Further, it is reasonable to suppose that such treatment is unwanted 
and that it is carried out without the animals’ consent. Of course, it could be argued that it 
makes no sense to talk of consent in relation to animals since, lacking language, they are 
not the sort of beings to which the notion of consent applies. However, one should be 
aware that there are different ways in which a being may be said to be a non-consenting 
one. A being may be deemed to be a non-consenting one either when it is not able to 
express consent (perhaps because of the circumstances it is forced to endure or because it 
lacks certain capacities), or when it expresses (through, for example, speech, vocalisation 
or body language) that the relevant action is unwanted. Animals could be seen to be non-
consenting in either of these ways.  
Nevertheless, it does seem that there is more to the concept ‘dignity’ than has 
been indicated above, and it has to be said that the concept often invokes ideas about the 
value of human life as over and above that of other beings. However, animal life and its 
flourishing has value too and, as such, it is still far from clear that the notion of dignity 
and its violationas concepts that relate to ideas about the value or worth of a being—
cannot be used with respect to animals and their lives.  
 
THE CRITERION OF EXCESSIVE INSTRUMENTALISATION 
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While the concept of dignity is usually applied exclusively to humans, its application to 
animals (in the context of animal experimentation and gene technology) is a crucial part 
of the Swiss constitution’s animal protection law. In attempting to provide a more 
concrete definition of dignity with regards to animals and in relation to Swiss law, the 
Swiss Ethics Committee on Non Human Gene Technology (ECNH) and the Swiss 
Committee on Animal Experiments (SCAE) produced a position paper entitled ‘The 
Dignity of Animals’ in which they stated that violation to dignity can be caused through 
(1) intervention in appearance (which includes changing animals’ capacities), (2) 
humiliation or (3) excessive instrumentalisation (2005).  
(That one can violate an animal’s dignity through using an animal in a way that 
can be deemed excessively instrumental has connections to Kant’s idea that one should 
never treat a person merely as a means, but also as an end. In ‘The Dignity of Animals’ 
the ECNH and SCAE do not give a definition of excessive instrumentalisation, but it 
does seem that it means being treated merely as a means to an end, and something like 
objectification. They provide examples of different treatment and usage of animals that 
seem to be suggestive of excessively instrumental treatment in that the animals’ interests 
are disregarded to the extent that they are treated as objects for human use, rather than as 
beings with interests of their own. One such example is that of hairless cats: ‘Hairless 
cats are bred as domestic animals. Their ability to retain warmth is impaired, and they 
often suffer from sunburn and other injuries. Comfort behaviour such as licking, as well 
as their sense of touch and orientation, are restricted. The argument in favour of breeding 
and keeping hairless cats is that their lack of hair allows people who suffer from allergies 
to keep a cat. This argument is of minor relevance, given the existence of other domestic 
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animals which do not cause allergies. Moreover, the damage and injury to the animals’ 
interests is significant’ (ibid, 2005). The existence of these cats is indicative of cats being 
used and seen as objects that can be manipulated for our own benefit, whatever the 
resultant harm caused to the cats (in this case, the harm can be seen in terms of 
restrictions from fulfilling potentialities and species-specific tendencies). For the ECNH 
and SCAE, ‘Living creatures should be respected and protected for their own sake’ 
(ibid.), rather than protected solely for their instrumental value. These committees would 
certainly argue that animals should not be treated solely as instruments or objects for our 
own use, and that animals’ interests should be given due consideration, and in cases 
where interests conflict a proper evaluation of those interests should be performed.)  
Returning to the committees’ criteria regarding what constitutes a violation of 
dignity, (1) and (3) can be readily applied to animals, both sentient and non-sentient. As 
the ECNH and SCAE state, in respect of excessive instrumentalisation, ‘the interests of 
individual animals in their own, if perhaps “unconscious”, existence i.e. their synergetic 
relationship with the environment (development, preservation of existence and 
reproduction) must be taken into account’ (ibid). The ECNH and SCAE admit that ‘the 
“humiliation” category is very much a human-centric concept’ (ibid). Humiliation does 
appear to be something that only self-conscious beings can feel and to be intimately 
connected to issues regarding a lowering of status, injury to one’s sense of self, the 
abasement of pride, and feelings of shame and embarrassment (feelings which animals 
supposedly cannot experience). That said, insofar as to humiliate a being is, in some 
sense, to lower the status of the being or degrade it, and insofar as beings can be 
humiliated by, for example, excessive manipulation of their appearance to the extent that 
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they are treated other than they are or treated in a way that goes against their own nature 
or belittles them, then the humiliation category may be applicable to animals. To 
humiliate in this instance refers to something we do to the animals, rather than something 
the animals feel. I assume that it is for reasons such as these that the committees believe it 
is a human-centric concept yet has relevance to the dignity of animals.  
The ECNH claims that ‘[r]ecognition of inherent value requires that animals be 
respected for their own sake, their specific characteristics, needs and behavioural 
patterns’ (ibid). While the current Swiss constitution requires that the dignity of only 
vertebrate animals be protected, the ECNH argues that, since the dignity of vertebrate 
animals is to be protected in virtue of these animals having inherent value, and that, 
further, all living beings or things (including invertebrate animals, plants and all forms of 
life) are seen to have inherent value, then they too should be seen as beings or things to 
which we should show consideration in terms of respecting their dignity.  
For the ECNH and SCAE then, in order to recognise what constitutes a violation 
of an animal’s dignity one must refer to certain criteria (that is (1), (2) and (3) above). 
However, they recognise that in protecting animals from unjustifiable suffering, pain, 
injury, distress and anxiety one may significantly be preventing them from being 
degraded (ibid). One may ask then as to what role the concept of dignity has that cannot 
be fulfilled by concepts like ‘harm’, ‘suffering’ and ‘distress’. In answer to this, the 
application of the concept of dignity to animals is supposed to provide more extensive or 
thorough protections for animals used in experiments and gene technology. Animals, for 
example, may be harmed through excessive instrumentalisation, a reduction of their 
capacities, or being restricted from exercising their capacities, although it may not be 
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explicitly obvious that they are suffering or in distress.  
While the ECNH and SCAE argue that ‘animal distress corresponding to 
particular criteria (suffering, pain, fear, injury, intervention in appearance, humiliation 
and excessive instrumentalisation) constitutes an injury to dignity’, this does not mean 
that the treatment of a being that satisfies these criteria is always unjustifiable. As the 
ECNH and SCAE go on to say, ‘the dignity of an animal is respected if violation of its 
dignity is considered justifiable on the basis of a careful evaluation of interests. However, 
dignity is violated if the evaluation of interests shows that the animal’s interests outweigh 
the interests of the other parties’ (ibid). For both these committees then there should be a 
comparable weighting of interests, with animals’ interests being given at the very least 
serious consideration.   
The ECNH and SCAE present a fairly thorough explanation of the concept of 
dignity and reference to the ‘excessive instrumentalisation’ criterion may explain why 
some treatment of animals appears to harm them even though it is not always clear that 
the animals in question are distressed or in pain. For example, parading a wild animal, 
say, a monkey, on a chain, down a street (perhaps as ‘entertainment’ for tourists), 
adorned in clothes, seems to be an example of the kind of treatment that could constitute 
a violation of dignity, but we could easily imagine that the monkey does not overtly 
appear distressed at all. Of course, it is reasonable to claim that treating a monkey in this 
way is wrong because it restricts the monkey from fulfilling its species-specific capacities 
and interests, and living a good life proper to its kind. But there does appear to be another 
dimension as to why this treatment is wrong. Indeed, there seems to be something else 
that is appalling about this treatment (even if the monkey ‘looks like’ it is enjoying itself) 
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that the criterion of excessive instrumentalisation may be able to explain. Further, that the 
behaviour of the animal is forced is not irrelevant, but discussion of this will be reserved 
for the section below.  
(However, it is not clear that such treatment would be wrong if it was carried out 
on, say, a dog, probably because treating a dog in this way would not restrict that dog 
from fulfilling a good life proper to its kind. And if the dog is not treated merely as a 
means to an end, but is allowed to live in relative freedom and in an environment suitable 
for living a life proper to its kind, then its treatment would not be completely instrumental 
or excessively instrumental. Treating a wild animal in this manner though will involve 
removing that animal from its natural environment, in a way that treating a domestic dog 
in this manner does not. I am not here committing myself to saying that such treatment of 
a dog is not a violation of dignity, but wishing only to highlight that what constitutes a 
violation of dignity to one animal may not constitute a violation of dignity to another.) 
 
AN ONTOLOGICAL EXPLANATION 
Suzanne Cataldi offers further insight into dignity, and its application to animals, by 
reference to a particular example (2002, 104-106). She refers to her visit to a Moscow 
circus, where bears could be seen whose appearance and behaviour was unnatural to their 
species-specific natures. In the lobby of the circus there were bears, in individual rooms 
or coves, which visitors could sit on and touch whilst having a family photograph taken. 
These bears had clown collars (similar to Elizabethan collars) around their necks and held 
balloons, by a string, in their paws. In the circus ring bears performed a number of 
‘tricks’. One bear, dressed in an apron, walked on its back legs, around the ring, pushing 
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a pram. Watching all these bears Cataldi, quite rightly, began to feel uncomfortable. She 
thought of how the bears came to behave and be like this. She began to ask questions to 
herself: Were the bears in the lobby drugged? Had the bears in the circus ring been 
tortured in order to perform these acts? (ibid, 104-107). While she suspects (and one 
should add, is probably correct in her suspicion3) that the bears had undergone possibly 
immense suffering in order to be doing these things, there is something else that she finds 
appalling and disturbing that she explains through talking of the bears’ dignity: 
All ‘broken in’—broken inside—they are like puppets on strings, 
hollowed out, stuffed animals. Externally controlled and manipulated, 
with the aid of silly props and costumes, in an unnatural (human) 
setting… these bears are made to appear weak and ridiculous… [A]t 
this stage, or on this stage, with their baby carriages and balloons, they 
really are, really do appear to be, beyond freedom and dignity (ibid, 
107). 
 
The manipulation, control and lack of freedom these bears are forced to endure results in 
the bears not being able to be the animals they actually are in reality. The circus 
performance suggests ‘an impoverished view of the value of their own reality, of their 
being the particular animals they are’ (ibid, 110). The massive extent to which the bears 
are instrumentalised has forced them to live a life completely unnatural to their kind, and 
this is what constitutes a violation of their dignity.  
The fact that they are forced and manipulated is relevant here, for what constitutes 
a violation of dignity is usually closely connected to actions that are carried out without 
consent (as indicated above), and dignity, as Cataldi says, is generally related to 
 17
‘concepts of freedom and autonomy’ (ibid, p.112). In analysing dignity in this way, 
Cataldi draws on Paul Taylor’s idea of freedom in relation to animals (ibid, 112). Taylor 
conceives of freedom ‘as a condition of not being constrained (hindered or prevented) 
with respect to what one might want to do. To be free in this sense is to be able to pursue 
one’s ends because no restrictions, obstacles, or forces frustrate one’s attempt… and 
because one has the necessary abilities, opportunities, and means to gain one’s ends’ 
(2011[1986], 108). Taylor’s sense of freedom is bound to his biocentrism; the normative 
stance that all living things have moral standing, and all have a good of their own (the 
fulfilment of which can be thwarted or promoted by human agents). Freedom in relation 
to animals means that animals are free from restrictions that prevent them from being 
able to fulfil their own good according to their species-specific nature; that conditions 
allow for their good to be realised (ibid,108-109). Sadly, in the case of the circus bears, 
their lack of freedom, together with excessive manipulation of their behaviour, not only 
prevents them from being able to live according to their own good, but further results in 
behaviour that (in some sense) is not their own.  
As Cataldi says, ‘dignity is related not only to notions of worth or value, but also 
to ideas of decency. Indecorous behaviour is improper (from propre: own), unbecoming 
or inappropriate—behaviour that does not suit one’s character or status—behaviour that 
is not one’s own (or specific to one’s species)’ (Cataldi 2002, 113).There is obviously a 
lack of recognition of the bears’ value, but their dignity is compounded by the fact that 
they are prevented from living their own form of existence or from living a life that 
allows them to exercise their species-specific tendencies or fulfil their own good. Their 
control really is such that they cannot be what they are. Their existence as circus animals 
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is, in many ways, ‘beyond freedom and dignity’ (ibid, 107). And such considerations 
apply not just to these circus bears, but also to other wild animals used for entertainment 
purposes, as well as animals used in modern-day practices such as factory farming, 
animal experimentation and fur farming. For Cataldi then the dignity of individual 
animals consists in ‘their being who or what they are’ (ibid, 116) in respect of their 
species-specific lives, and not valuing the individual species-specific lives of beings or 
showing consideration for the ways in which they live their lives (including exercising 
their natural tendencies), may prevent the flourishing or good of those animals.  
 Of course, the objection may be raised that only those beings that desire dignity 
and autonomy can be said to be capable of having their dignity violated and that, since 
animals cannot desire either, it makes no sense to talk of dignity in relation to animals 
(see Cataldi 2002, 115). However, it is not clear that no animals can desire (something 
like) autonomy. Of course, most animals may not be autonomous in the sense of being 
capable of making goals and plans for the future and acting to fulfil those goals and 
plans. But neither are all humans capable of this and those that are capable do not always 
fulfil their plans and goals. A broader definition of autonomy could be defined as 
‘personal rule of the self that is free from both controlling interferences by others and 
from personal limitations that prevent meaningful choice, such as inadequate 
understanding’ (Beauchamp and Childress 1994, 121). Some nonhumans, it seems, would 
be seen as autonomous if autonomy is defined in this way.  
Of course, whether one wants to say that animals are autonomous or not depends 
on what one defines as ‘autonomy’, but I think it is fair to say that most animals have an 
interest in living their own lives in relative freedom, free from the sort of coercion and 
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control that would be detrimental to their well-being or flourishing (however we define 
autonomy). Whether they have a desire to live this way is a different issue, but they could 
have a desire to live this way even if they do not recognise that desire. Cataldi certainly 
seems to think that animals do have a desire to live a relatively autonomous life: ‘while I 
think it is hard to know what animals do and do not consciously experience, it seem to me 
that they may be as sensitive as we are to something like their own ‘personhood’ and that 
they do desire to live a dignified, or relatively self-possessed, life’ (ibid, 115).  However, 
even if animals do not have such a desire, all animals have, at the very least, an interest in 
being free to live a life natural to their own kind. 
 But, as Cataldi rightly points out, the above objection confuses the concept 
‘dignity’ with the desire for dignity (ibid, 115). The application of the concept to animals 
is not dependent on them having certain psychological states, such as the desire for 
dignity (and neither is its application to humans dependent on this). Rather, it is 
dependent upon animals having value other than the value ascribed to them by humans. 
And one might add that since animals have do indeed have a good of their own which is 
intrinsically valuable (whether or not they have certain desires), actions that show no 
consideration for their good and tend to frustrate or undermine could possibly be a 
violation of their dignity.  
Besides, as said above, we do apply the concept ‘dignity’ to humans who lack the 
desire for dignity. In fact, it is those humans who have limited capacities (whether these 
are physical or mental ones), compared to healthy adult humans that are most likely to 
have their dignity violated. In respect of severely mentally disabled humans, their living a 
life which allows them to flourish, as far as possible (albeit in a limited sense), as 
 20
severely mentally disabled humans, may be dependent upon other people fulfilling their 
basic needs and considering their interests (in so far as they are not capable of furthering 
their own interests and fulfilling their own needs). This makes them extremely vulnerable 
to treatment that is detrimental to their own good as severely mentally disabled humans. 
Preventing such people from living a life that allows them to fulfil their own good, as 
severely mentally disabled humans, might well be considered to undermine their dignity. 
While Cataldi’s ontological explanation of the dignity of animals4 is appealing in 
that it offers a plausible reason why certain treatment of animals (such as the treatment of 
the bears in the Moscow circus) is wrong irrespective of whether or not we know the 
animals are made to suffer, it is not clear that we need a concept of dignity to explain 
why certain treatment is wrong. Indeed, she appeals to the good of animals and to the 
species-specific natures of animals in her explanation for why the treatment of the circus 
bears is so appalling, and such appeals are a reason in themselves for why such treatment 
is wrong, independent of talk of the bears’ Being and irrespective of whether or not such 
treatment causes suffering.  
As such, talk of a violation of dignity may not, in itself, give an adequate 
explanation for why some actions are wrong, since there will always be an underlying 
further appeal to other reasons (such as suffering, harm or premature death).  One should 
say that this applies to humans too. That is, talk of dignity and its violation in relation to 
either animals or humans does not always give an adequate explanation for why some 
actions are wrong (yet we frequently use the word ‘dignity’ in relation to humans). 
However, in spite of this, the concept and its application may be able to give us a 
greater understanding of the complexity of the ways in which animals can be harmed in 
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allowing us to recognise that specific harms caused to animals, and concomitant injuries 
and frustrations, may constitute or result in further harm.  In this sense it may be that 
‘dignity’ should best be seen as an ‘umbrella’ term (Rolston too defines it as such, but 
believes the concept to be applicable to human only (Rolston 2008, 129-153)) that, in the 
case of the circus bears for example, refers to all the things we perceive to be appalling 
and heartrending about such treatment; that is, the excessive instrumentalisation, the lack 
of consideration for the bears’ interests or well-being, the lack of recognition of the 
bears’ value, the prevention of the bears fulfilling their species-specific tendencies and 
the total lack of concern for the bears’ good or flourishing.  
 
APPLYING THE CONCEPT TO ANIMALS 
The notion of dignity seems to be similar, if not the same, to another notion often used in 
ethics—the notion of integrity: 
Integrity goes beyond considerations of an animal’s health and welfare, 
and it applies not only to present but also to future animals. An animal’s 
integrity is violated when through human intervention it is no longer 
whole or intact, if its species-specific balance is changed, or if it no 
longer has the capacity to sustain itself in an environment suitable to its 
species (Bovenkerk, Brom, and van den Bergh 2002, 21).  
 
Thus, this description of integrity seems to be fitting as a description of dignity too, the 
only difference being that dignity can be violated not only through human intervention; it 
can also be violated by circumstances not caused by humans and beyond human control, 
such as crippling disease and illness. While the concept of dignity is very difficult to 
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explain, as is the concept of integrity, such difficulties do not make those concepts 
useless in moral discussion: 
It is important… not to reject the concept [of integrity] too swiftly 
because of difficulties in setting out precisely what it involves. In the 
light of ongoing technological developments we are confronted with 
dilemmas that traditional moral concepts cannot deal with, and we have 
a responsibility to try to define our moral thinking and to develop 
criteria that help us act in a morally justifiable way… The concept thus 
does not refer to an objective state of affairs, but to one that we feel is 
important to preserve. Yet we need not regard the concept as 
completely subjective either. While it does not refer to empirically 
ascertainable biological facts, we can still establish intersubjective 
criteria for its application. Through moral discussion, we can reach 
agreement about what sorts of actions do and do not lead to violations 
of integrity (ibid, 21). 
Indeed, we should be wary of dismissing the notion of dignity and its usefulness simply 
because of the fact that it appears slippery and vague, particularly as the concept seems to 
be the one that is appropriate in certain circumstances. Further, it may be that in order for 
the concept of dignity to inform our understanding of ethical relationships, that concept 
cannot be separated from the situational context in which the concept is applied (at the 
time of application). Indeed, being able to apply and use many evaluative concepts is 
often dependent upon the depth of one’s immersion within the circumstances in which 
those concepts have relevance. Some concepts only have meaning when they are seen in 
 23
connection with the situation or experience in which they are used. This may go some 
way towards explaining why the concept of dignity is so difficult to define. Only in 
connection with their rich situational context can some concepts have form 
Moreover, as suggested in the above section on dignity and its violation, although 
the concept of dignity is difficult to put into words, we can come to understand it through 
considering its opposite. Indeed, Martha Nussbaum, whilst recognising that dignity is 
hard to define, notes that ‘it is rather clear what it does not mean: the conditions of circus 
animals… squeezed into cramped and filthy cages, starved, terrorised, and beaten’ (2006, 
326). Further, she argues that animals 
 are capable of dignified existence… Dignified existence would seem to 
at least include the following: adequate opportunities for nutrition and 
physical activity; freedom from pain, squalor, and cruelty; freedom to act 
in ways that are characteristics of the species (rather than to be confined 
and… made to perform silly and degrading stunts); freedom from fear 
and opportunities for rewarding interactions with other creatures of the 
same species, and of different species; and to enjoy the light and air in 
tranquillity’ (ibid, 326).  
For Nussbaum, preventing animals for being able to enjoy such freedoms—freedoms that 
are essential to their flourishing and which enable them to exercise their capabilities—is 
‘an issue of justice’ (ibid). While Nussbuam is indebted to elements of Kantian theory, 
she rejects the Kantian basis of the principle of dignity as rooted in rationality,6 and does 
not endorse those aspects that exclude animals from being capable of living a dignified 
existence on the basis that they lack rationality; such an approach she believes not only 
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underestimates the intelligence of many animals (ibid, 327), but also fails to recognise 
animals as beings which ‘have entitlements based upon justice’ (ibid, 392). (It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to discuss issues related to inter-species justice, but the author 
draws the reader’s attention to a list of works, relating to such issues, in the endnotes.5) 
Returning to the case of the Moscow circus bears, one may be able to see their 
treatment as a violation of dignity by understanding or recognising that it is a whole set of 
circumstances (seen in their entirety), that these bears are forced to endure, that prevents 
them from being able to maintain dignity. It is the situation itself, its details, and the 
bears’ forced predicament and behaviour that belittle the bears, and show their 
circumstances to be ones which indicate a lack of recognition of the bears’ own worth or 
value. It seems that every single thing about their situation belittles or degrades them: 
their ‘performances’; their adornment of frilly clothes (or clothes in general); the fact that 
they are mocked by the audience; and overall the massive extent to which they are forced 
and manipulated to act in a way completely abnormal for bears, together with the 
audiences’ laughter and total ignorance about the bears’ deprivation and about the scale 
of the abuse taking place. These are all aspects of the situation that inform us of the 
appropriateness of the application of the concept ‘degrading’ to the bears’ pitiful and 
cruel circumstances.  
Recognition of such a set of circumstances may often require using our 
imagination to some greater or lesser extent and, as such, applying the notion of dignity 
to animals may require some imaginative reflection. This is not to deny that it may be 
possible to apply the concept through reason alone. Indeed, I have attempted to provide a 
definition of dignity and its violation, which somewhat implies that it is a concept that 
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can be applied without imaginative or emotive reflection. But, more often than not, 
understanding the concept may require being able to put oneself in the circumstances or 
position of another being, or understanding the sufferings of another being, and this 
requires using the imagination to some lesser or greater extent. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the case of the circus bears, apart from talking about the intolerable suffering these 
animals are made to endure, talking of a violation of ‘dignity’ seems to be the word that 
belongs. We would not hesitate in bringing into the discussion the word ‘dignity’ if 
similar things were done to human beings. Moreover, since dignity is connected to the 
disabling and injuring of a being to the extent that it prevents that being from functioning 
or living a life natural to its kind, speaking of ‘dignity’ and its violation does seem to 
capture the unjustifiable and immoral nature of some practices (including those such as 
bear bile farming, intensive rearing, and fur farming). 
An understanding of how and when the concept of dignity can be appropriately 
applied to animals may play an important role in informing us of those actions that can 
harm animals. While right conduct is not dependent upon a conception of dignity (or its 
application to our lives with animals), the concept of dignity nevertheless can inform and 
enhance our understanding of the ways in which animals can be vulnerable to harm. 
Admittedly, we do not need the concept of dignity to explain the immoral natural of some 
practices. As said above, concepts like harm, suffering and premature death can explain 
why some practices are wrong. But this does not make the concept of dignity useless in 
enhancing our understanding of the unjustifiable nature of some practices that use 
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animals, such as factory farming, and of some cruel treatment of animals, such as forcing 
bears to ‘dance’ for entertainment or perform acts in circuses. If we perceive the 
enormous and intolerable suffering of these bears, and of other unfortunate animals used 
in immoral practices, and see that suffering for what it truly is—heartbreaking, appalling 
and immeasurable—then, maybe, we will be able to see that dignity and its violation is a 
notion that can be appropriately applied to animals and their lives. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
(1.) For unethical research on humans see James Dubois. 2008. Ethics in Mental Health 
Research: Principles, Guidance, and Cases. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 14-16; J. 
Katz. 1972. Experimentation with Human Beings. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; 
R. Whitaker. 2002. Mad in America. Cambridge, MA: Perseus; and S. E. Lederer. 1995. 
Subjected to Science: Human Experimentation in America Before the Second World War. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.  
 
(2.) This is not to deny that the criterion of excessive instrumentalisation (see section 
entitled ‘The Criterion of Excessive Instrumentalisation’) may be able to explain why 
some actions may be said to constitute a violate dignity.  
 
(3.) Trying to get a bear to do something you want it to do, even such as, for example, 
walk of its own accord into a den full of food (let alone perform tricks), is no mean feat 
and extremely difficult. Thus it is highly likely that the bears had undergone considerable 
suffering and torment in order that they might be ‘trained’ to ‘perform’ for circus goers.  
 
(4.) For Cataldi, the dignity of animals is related to ‘their being who or what they are’ 
(2002, 116), and in this sense her explanation of dignity can be seen to be ontological.  
 
(5.) See Garner, Robert. 2013. A Theory of Justice for Animals: Animal Rights in a 
Nonideal World. New York: Oxford University Press; Clement, Grace. 2013. ‘Animals 
and Moral Agency: The Recent Debate and Its Implications’. Journal of Animal Ethics. 3 
(1): 1-14; Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, 
Species Membership. Cambridge, MA:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University; 
Moellendorf, Darrel. 2011. ‘Cosmopolitan and Compatriot Duties’. The Monist. 94 (4): 
535-554; and Rowlands, Mark. 2013. ‘Animals and Moral Motivation: A Response to 
Clement’. Journal of Animal Ethics. 3 (1): 15-24. 
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(6.) For an examination of the contrasts between Kant’s conception of dignity and 
Nussbaum’s see Formosa, Paul, and Catriona Mackenzie. 2014. ‘Nussbaum, Kant, and 
the Capabilities Approach to Dignity’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 17 (5): 875-
892.  
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